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Inflation targeting strategy has become a widely accepted monetary policy framework in 
many countries all over the world. Our study finds that the central bank of Bangladesh is 
neither inflation targeting nor does follow any other rule-guided monetary policy, rather 
the policy is formulated with substantial discretion under the guidelines of donor agencies. 
This paper provides the evidence that monetary sector of Bangladesh economy has gained 
considerable degree of maturity and fulfils a number of prerequisites to adopt inflation 
targeting strategy. Using data over 1980-2010 we estimate an error correction model in 
order  to  examine  if  interest  rate  policy  could  fight  the  inflation.  This  is  evident  that 
deviation  in  inflation  from  target  can  be  corrected  via  the  changes  in  interest  rate. 
Empirical  findings  jointly  with  few  descriptive  statistics  provide  strong  evidence  to 
recommend inflation targeting as the monetary policy strategy for Bangladesh. 
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Inflation targeting as a monetary policy strategy is becoming increasingly popular among 
the emerging and advanced economies. With the collapse of Bretton Woods system in the 
early  1970,  the  room  of  explicit  inflation  targeting  by  the  central  banks  of  emerging 
economies has been opened. This new strategy was first approved by New Zealand in 1990, 
followed  by  Bank  of  Canada  and  Israel  in  1991  and  the  Bank  of  England  in  1992. 
Numerical inflation target determining other countries are Czech Republic, Korea in 1988, 
Poland, Brazil, Columbia in 1999, South Africa and Thailand in 2000. The twenty years old 
inflation targeting strategy is accepted by more than twenty countries so far. A number of 
other countries have adopted certain aspects of this new regime and some are currently 
considering to adopt fully-fledged inflation targeting in the next few years. According to 
Petursson  (2004)  the  reason  for  this  increasing  popularity  is  that  inflation  targeting  is 
thought to combine the two aspects important for successful monetary policy: providing a 
credible  medium  term  anchor  for  inflation  expectation  and  allowing  policy  enough 
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flexibility  to  respond  to  short-run  shocks  without  jeopardising  the  credibility  of  the 
framework. It is evident from the available literatures that many of the inflation targeting 
countries have been successful in fighting high inflation without harming output growth or 
increasing  business  cycle  variability.  Popularity  of  inflation  targeting  is  unanimous  but 
there  is  no  study  if  Bangladesh  could  switch  to  this  new  regime.  A  good  number  of 
researches  have  been  carried  out  regarding  the  suitability  of  inflation  targeting  in  non-
targeting countries like India, Pakistan, China and many others. Mishra and Mishra (2009) 
concluded that inflation band targeting should be a suitable monetary policy strategy for 
India. One research by Malik and Ahmed (2007) firmly suggests that Pakistan can adopt 
Taylor  rule-based  monetary  policy  that  is  indeed  the  reaction  function  under  inflation 
targeting  framework.  This  paper  is  the  first  effort  to  explore  the  implementability  of 
inflation targeting in Bangladesh. 
The  paper  is  organised  such  that  next  section  illustrates  the  basic  features  of  inflation 
targeting. Section 3 explains the rationale for inflation targeting, section 4 discusses the 
mechanism  of  inflation  targeting,  section  5  documents  the  preconditions  of  inflation 
targeting with some empirical results, section 6 examines the impact of inflation targeting 
and section 7 concludes.  
1.  Basic Features of Inflation Targeting 
To be inflation targeter there should have a public announcement of a numerical target of 
inflation with the commitment of maintaining price stability. Price stability obtains when 
economic agents no longer take account of the prospective change in the general price level 
in their economic decision making (Greenspan, 2004).  Petursson (2004) illustrates, ―the 
chief characteristic of inflation targeting can be said to involve a public announcement of 
numerical  target  to  which the central bank commits itself to  keep inflation as close  as 
possible  by  implementing  a  forward-looking  policy‖.  Inflation  targeting  is  sometimes 
referred to as ―inflation forecast targeting‖ because the inflation forecast over some horizon 
is the de facto intermediate target of policy (Svensson, 1997).  There is a consensus among 
researchers that for a successful implementation of inflation targeting central banks have to 
be transparent and accountable. Transparency is the extent to which an institution discloses 
information that is related to the policy-making process (Gosselin, 2007). According to the 
IMF, the effectiveness of monetary policy can be strengthened if the goals and instruments 
are known to the public. This is to be stressed that even there are some central banks that 
view price stability as their policy objective and publicly announce the inflation target but 
they are not inflation targeting. European Central Bank is one such. At the same time it is 
not guaranteed that monetary policy was transparent at the time of introducing inflation 
targeting. In many cases publication of inflation reports did not begin until several years 
after the country moved on to the new regime. The bank of Israel began publishing inflation 
reports in 1998 and the Central Bank of Chile in 2000, six and ten years respectively after 
they  had  formally  begun  targeting.  Official  inflation  forecasts  in  Sweden,  Mexico  and 
Poland were not published until some time after targeting was adopted. Australia, Canada 
and Iceland did not announce monetary policy decisions until some time after the targeting 
strategy was introduced. The survey by Schmidt-Hebbel and Tapia (2002) found that only 
twelve of the sample twenty inflation-targeting countries interpreted their inflation forecasts 
as intermediate monetary policy targets.    
Mishkin (2006) concluded that with the adoption of inflation targeting strategy, inflation 




pass-through seems to be attenuated. Inflation persistence is lower and inflation expectation 
appears to be better anchored in inflation targeting countries. Mishkin, however, argues that 
such developments do not imply that the inflation targeting countries have done better than 
the non-inflation-targeting countries since these developments were also experienced by the 
non-targeting countries. There is a consensus that inflation targeting has led to substantial 
developments  in  the  practical  aspects  of  monetary  policy  (Gosselin,  2007).  These 
developments  include  a  more  systematic  and  consistent  internal  decision  process,  more 
transparent  communication  with  the  private  sector  and  a  high  degree  of  accountability 
(Svensson, 2005). Roger and Stone (2005) view inflation targeting as standard, transparent, 
accountable  and  credible.  Paulin  (2006)  concludes  that  the  resilience  of  the  regime  is 
attributable to its credibility and flexibility.  
 
2. Rationale for Inflation Targeting 
The time inconsistency literature argues that a purely discretionary policy setting leads to 
higher long-run inflation (Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Barro and Gordon, 1983). Rule-
based monetary policy may be the best strategy to avoid high inflation and to lower the 
variabilities in inflation and output. Monetary authority cannot directly control the ultimate 
objectives of monetary policy. Under rule-based regime central banks set explicit values for 
the intermediate target which they can control and which are strongly related to the ultimate 
goals of monetary policy like output and inflation stabilization. In recent times emerging 
market economies have experimented with three nominal targets at various times: exchange 
rate, money supply growth and inflation (Jha, 2006). Exchange rate targeting strategy fixes 
the inflation rate for internationally traded goods and thus directly contributes to keeping 
inflation under control. Being simple, direct and well understood by the public, exchange 
rate provides an automatic rule for the conduct of monetary policy. The main disadvantage 
is that an exchange rate target leads to a loss of independent monetary policy (Obstfeld and 
Rogof,  1996).  Exchange  rate  peg  may  persuade  large  scale  foreign  borrowing.  Huge 
accumulation  of  such  borrowing  may  lead  to  crisis,  especially  in  emerging  market 
economies where the loans are denominated in foreign currency. Mishkin (1997) argues 
that exchange rate peg can lead to financial fragility.  
Monetary  targeting  enables  a  central  bank  to  adjust  its  monetary  policy  to  cope  with 
domestic  consideration.  Monetary  targeting  is  an  accountable  strategy  that  is  easily 
understood by the common  people. Existing literatures,  however, indentify at least two 
basic disadvantages of monetary targeting. Firstly, the link between money growth and 
inflation is subject to long and uncertain lags. Secondly, the demand for money may not be 
stable, there may be instability of velocity and money supply may not be controllable (Jha 
& Rath, 2003).  
Inflation  targeting  enables  monetary  policy  to  focus  on  domestic  consideration  and  to 
respond to shocks to the domestic economy. The goals of inflation targeting are defined 
almost  exclusively  in  terms  of  addressing  inflation  shocks.  Inflation  targeting  is  easily 
understandable to the public and, above all, since the central bank has an explicit numerical 
inflation target, the possibility of slipping into a time inconsistency trap is reduced (Jha, 
2008). Inflation targeting is more flexible strategy as the short-term deviation of inflation 
from the target are acceptable and do not necessarily translate into losses in credibility. The 
scope for greater flexibility could reduce variability in the output gap. Inflation targeting 
involves a lower economic cost in the face of monetary policy failures. It seems inflation Economia. Seria Management                                  Volume 14, Issue 1, 2011 
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targeting provides a bridge to fill the gap between rules and discretion in pursuing monetary 
policy.  Thus  Svensson  (1999)  argues  that  inflation  targeting  is  ‗decision  making  under 
discretion‘ with central bank following a targeting rule which sets interest rates to reduce 
the deviation between conditional inflation forecast (the intermediate target of monetary 
policy)  and  the  inflation  target  to  zero  over  the  target  horizon.  Bernanke  et  al.  (1999) 
describe  inflation  targeting  as  ―constrained  discretion‖  where  the  target  imposes  the 
constraint while interpretation and implementation provide the flexibility.   
Developing  countries  have  weak  institutions,  small  information  set,  low  capacity  of 
professionals and monetary policy having multiple objectives without clear prioritisation 
(Malik & Ahmed, 2007). Calvo and Mishkin (2003) indentify five fundamental institutional 
problems in developing countries: weak financial institutions, low credibility of monetary 
institutions, currency substitution, liability dollarisation and sudden stops in capital inflows. 
These  practicalities  induce  the  policy  makers  of  developing  countries  employ  their 
discretion. But in the  face of  such  financial crises it  would be in their interest  for the 
developing countries to adopt a rule-based monetary regime. 
Bangladesh  economy  faces  a  number  of  challenges  stemming  from  both  demand  and 
supply sides. Highly volatile world price of oil causes considerable changes in general price 
level in the country. Besides oil, Bangladesh has to import food stuff to feed the big-sized 
population. Increasing  world prices of food and oil exert upward pressure  on domestic 
inflation. Moreover, limited provision for industrial employment can absorb only a minor 
portion of labour force every year. Under the above circumstances, the central bank of 
Bangladesh- the Bangladesh Bank has to be much prudent in structuring monetary policy. 
Apart from the basic objectives of price and output stabilities, Bangladesh Bank has to take 
account of government‘s fiscal management. This comes from the narrow base of fiscal 
revenue relative to fiscal and development expenditures.    
The central bank of Bangladesh implements monetary policy by setting the reserve money 
(RM) as the operating target and broad money (M2) as intermediate target in the monetary 
policy framework. Reserve money is defined as the sum of currency outside bank, balances 
of deposit money banks (DMBs) and other financial institutions with Bangladesh Bank, and 
cash in tills of the DMBs. Broad money (M2), on the other hand, is defined as the sum of 
currency outside banks, demand deposits and time deposits. Bangladesh Bank influences 
the RM by using various policy tools. Success of monetary policy largely depends on the 
controllability  of  reserve  money.  In  the  context  of  Bangladesh  economy  there  are  four 
players  who  influence  the  money  supply  process,  e.g.,  Bangladesh  Bank,  government, 
DMBs and public depositors and borrowers of DMBs.  The Bangladesh bank projects GDP 
growth  and  inflation  rate,  and  in  line  with  projected  GDP  growth  rate  and  inflations 
expectations it sets safe limit of M2 growth target. Reserve money expansion is targeted in 
a way that it is consistent with M2 projection. But despite the aforementioned measures, the 
Bangladesh Bank has a rather loose control over money supply which is evident in the 
existing gap between targeted and actual money growth (see Islam, 2008).  
Both direct and indirect policy tools are employed by Bangladesh Bank to maintain reserve 
money at the desired level in line with targeted M2 growth. Among others the main tools 
are  SLR,  CRR,  repo,  reverse  repo,  open  market  operation,  intervention  in  the  foreign 
exchange market and moral suasion. Until the early 1990s, the central bank of Bangladesh 
used to frequently change CRR, SLR, and the bank rate along with other direct instruments. 
Before introducing repo and reverse repo instruments in 2003 Bangladesh Bank relied on 




its own T-bills (30-day and 90-day) and on interbank repo for meeting short term liquidity 
of DMBs. Bangladesh Bank reintroduced its own 30-day and 90-day bills in 2006 in the 
event of changing debt management by the government.  
Under financial sector reform programme of 1990, the monetary authority of Bangladesh 
performed  several  restructuring  in  policy  framework  by  replacing  a  few  direct  tools. 
Instead, it took liberal interest rate policy and market based policy tools including flexible 
exchange rate system in 2003. Since January 2006 the central bank introduced the practice 
of announcing the bi-annual monetary policy stance through the monetary policy statement 
(MPS).  
The dynamics of money supply in Bangladesh economy is tractable via the equation (1) 
RM M . 2                                                       (1) 
Where,   indicates  money  multiplier  that  mainly  depends  on  currency -deposit  ratio, 
reserve-deposit ratio, and the excess reserve-deposit ratio. Whether Bangladesh Bank can 
implement  effective  monetary  policy  depends  on  if  it  has  enough  control   over  reserve 
money. Actual behaviour shows that reserve money level most often exceeded the target 
level which is due to government‘s pressure on central bank to take part in financing fiscal 
deficit. The above features characterise an incompetent monetary policy existence in the 
country. Both government and monetary authority have the consensus that a policy should 
be in place which can ensure price stability, maintain high growth, generate employment 
and at the same time stabilise exchange rate. Recently price stability has become the most 
overriding concern in Bangladesh because all other variables are posting favourable signs 
except  inflation.  Point-to-point  inflation  is  about  to  reach  a  double  digit  rate  whereas 
economic agents are quite inflation-averse. With reasonably good expansion of the real 
economy and sound stock of foreign currency reserve the country has the opportunity to 
head toward a successful inflation targeting strategy.  
 
3.  Inflation Targeting Mechanism 
Monetary policy committee meetings of the central bank revise its inflation and output 
forecast using updated information. Interest rate is raised if central bank finds a higher 
forecast  of  inflation  than  the  target.  Agents  plan  their  consumption  and  investment 
accordingly. Inflation targeting central banks, in practice, would set their interest rate as a 
function of current inflation, output gap and the difference between current inflation and 
targeted inflation. Such formulation of reaction function is the famous Taylor (1993) rule. 
Taylor rule is a linear algebraic rule described by equation (2) below that specifies how the 
Federal Reserve must adjust its funds rate according to the inflation rate and the output gap:  
t
*
t t t by ) ( h r i                                         (2)  
where,  t i is the nominal rate of interest 
r  is the long run equilibrium real rate of interest 
t  is the year on year inflation rate 
*  is target inflation rate  
t y is percentage deviation of real output from potential output. Economia. Seria Management                                  Volume 14, Issue 1, 2011 
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Equilibrium  real  interest  rate,r together  with  current  inflation  rate, t    provides  a 
benchmark recommendation for the nominal interest rate. Inflation gap adjustment factor, 
) (
*    t  recommends raising the interest rate above the benchmark if inflation is above 
the target and lowering the interest rate below benchmark if inflation is below the target. 
The last term is an output gap adjustment factor based on the gap between real  GDP and 
potential GDP. This factor recommends raising the interest rate above the benchmark if the 
gap is positive and lowering the interest rate below the benchmark if the gap is negative. 
Taylor (1993) sets both the long run equilibrium real interest ra te and the target inflation 
rate equal to 2, and  h  and b are set equal to 0.5. Taylor applied his rule to the US for the 
period 1987-92 where he found that the proposed rule describe the actual performance of 
policy very well. Inflation targeting, however, is not applied mechanically. The inflation 
targeting rule does not simply focus on current inflation but on containing inflation as a 
medium-term goal. Hence central banks pay close attention to indicators that c an predict 
future inflation accurately (Bernanke & Mishkin, 1997).  
 
4. Preconditions for Inflation Targeting 
A number of prerequisites are expected to hold for the inflation targeting to be successful. 
However, there is no strong consensus that success of inflation targeting strictly adhere to 
these  prerequisites.  We  have  documented  several  conditions  below  that  are  theoretical 
requirement for implementing inflation targeting but in practice these are neither necessary 
nor sufficient conditions for the success of this regime.  
 
4.1 Central Bank Independence  
For  a  successful  introduction  of  inflation  targeting  there  should  have  central  banks‘ 
independence  with  considerable  freedom  in  setting  monetary  policy  instruments  and  a 
minimum burden of financing government deficits. Deficit financing is feared because high 
deficit causes high inflation that raises interest rate and that ultimately raises the deficit 
itself  by  raising  debt  service  payment.  Successful  implementation  of  inflation  targeting 
requires  the  avoidance  of  fiscal  dominance.  Mishra  and  Mishra  (2009)  define  fiscal 
dominance as a situation when irresponsible fiscal policy (or a large fiscal deficit of the 
government) puts pressure on the monetary authorities to monetize debt, thereby producing 
rapid  money  growth  and  high  inflation.  Truman  (2003)  suggests,  the  probability  of 
adopting inflation targeting increases with improved fiscal position. Mishkin and Schmidt-
Hebbel (2001) and Truman (2003) argue that the more independent the central bank, the 
greater the probability of adopting an inflation target but they did not find any significant 
correlation between inflation targeting adoption and central bank independence. Amato and 
Gerlach (2002), however, show that fiscal performance improved after inflation targeting 
had been adopted. Therefore, it should not be strictly viewed as a prerequisite. Israel and 
the Phillipines, for example, had high public debt/GDP ratios and larger fiscal deficits at the 
time they adopted inflation targeting. Central bank independence was not done for the Bank 
of England until 1997 and Swedish Riksbank until 1999 although both adopted inflation 




4.2 Disappearance of External Dominance 
External  dominance  is  defined  as  the  presence  of  large  external  shocks  that  generates 
instability in the economy and may jeopardize the fulfilment of inflation target. Inflation 
targeting counties are more open to international trade and have comparatively less fiscal 
debt. Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) show that the probability of adopting inflation 
targeting increases the more open the economy is. As open economies are more vulnerable 
to external shocks they may have difficulties maintaining a fixed exchange rate regime, 
therefore choosing an inflation targeting to provide a nominal anchor (Calvo & Mishkin, 
2003). Gerlach (1999) concludes that countries with relatively undiversified export base are 
more likely to adopt inflation targeting. If the export base is narrow then the economy is 
more vulnerable to the external shocks. In such situation it is difficult to maintain a fixed 
exchange  rate.  Inflation  targeting  should  be  the  best  alternative  that  matches  floating 
exchange  rate.  Some  researchers,  however,  do  not  find  significant  relation  between 
openness and inflation targeting adoption.    
4.3 Sound Financial System  
Inflation targeting requires an advanced and stable financial system for an independent and 
efficient implementation. If the financial sector is fragile and prone to financial crisis or 
segmented, it poses problems in the independent conduct of monetary policy. Developing 
economies often lack stable financial system thereby find inflation targeting framework 
risky to implement. Immature financial market results in lack of confidence among the 
investors. Volatility in stock market creates panic among the small scale investors. Such 
occurrences  are  frequent  in  emerging  market  economies.  Bangladesh,  for  example, 
experienced terrible stock market crash in 1996. Thousands of investors lost their capital 
overnight in the face of massive fall in capital market index. Recently, in December 2010, 
Dhaka Stock Exchange showed symptom of volatility through the biggest crash in its 55-
year history. Analysts, however, predict that stock market of Bangladesh does not seem to 
experience further catastrophic event similar to one took place in 1996. If such prediction 
holds  true  then  confidence  on  financial  market  of  Bangladesh  is  likely  to  be  regained. 
Overall monetary indicators including the stability of export and foreign remittances in this 
country seem to have improved over last couple of years. Our understanding favours the 
possibility of launching inflation targeting strategy in Bangladesh provided that financial 
sector of this economy continues to maintain the current level of stability in next couple of 
years.       
4.4  Well Developed Technical Structure  
Central bank must have inflation forecasting and modelling capabilities and the data needed 
to implement them.  Amato and Gerlach (2001) argue that since inflation targeting is  a 
forward-looking  monetary  policy  strategy,  there  is  need  for  econometric  models  of  the 
inflation process and the transmission mechanism. Only with such models, policy makers 
can judge what level of interest rates is appropriate in given economic conditions although 
the existence of such model is rare in practice. Survey of Batini and Laxton (2007) reveals 
that  the  majority  of  industrial  and  emerging  market  targeters  started  with  little  or  no 
forecasting capability and no forecasting model. When a small model was available, most 
central  banks  report  that  it  was  not  suitable  to  make  forecasts  conditional  on  different 
assumptions for the monetary policy instrument. In addition, although industrial country 
targeters often had some sort of systematic forecast process in place, most emerging market 
targeters did not. Batini and Laxton (2007) add that inflation targeting to be implementable Economia. Seria Management                                  Volume 14, Issue 1, 2011 
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prices must be fully deregulated, the economy should not be overly sensitive to commodity 
prices and exchange rates and dollarization should be minimal.  
4.5 Interest Rate as the Policy Instrument 
An inflation targeting framework requires short term nominal rate of interest as the policy 
instrument. Central bank is expected to set the rate of interest that will ensure substantial 
stability in terms of inflation and output variability. Nominal anchor of inflation plays the 
key  role  in  inflation  targeting  regime.  If  there  appears  inflationary  pressure,  monetary 
authority would increase nominal rate by a substantial amount so the real rate of interest 
increases thereby reduce demand hence inflation. Similarly, if the economy operates above 
its capacity then demand would be forced down through the increase in interest rate.  
Advanced economies have gained success in this regard. Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) sets federal funds rate in the event of inflation and business cycle. Developing 
economies are lagging behind in this event since many of them use monetary aggregates as 
the policy instrument although monetary aggregate as the policy instrument is losing its 
popularity over time due to its vagueness.  
The above preconditions are theoretical in nature as they exert little importance in practical 
perspectives  of  inflation  targeting.  Amato  and  Gerlach  (2001)  had  one  study  with  the 
conclusion that the preconditions do in fact play little role in practice, rather the evidence 
indicates that steps are taken to satisfy the so-called preconditions only after the adoption of 
inflation targeting. Mishkin (2004) has similar view:  
“However,  although  fiscal  and  financial  stability  are  necessary  conditions  for 
inflation  control,  I  think  the  view  that  these  reforms  are  prerequisites  for 
attempting an inflation targeting regime in emerging market counties is too strong 
.. .. .. If an inflation targeting regime is to be sustainable, a commitment to and 
work on these reforms is required when inflation targeting is implemented.” 
Batini and Laxton (2007) administered a survey of 21 inflation targeting central banks to 
investigate how policy was formulated, implemented and communicated and how various 
aspects of central banking practice had changed before and during the adoption of targeting. 
The evidence indicates that no inflation targeter had these preconditions in place before 
adopting inflation targeting. It indicates that failure to meet the preconditions should not be 
an  impediment  to  the  adoption  and  success  of  inflation  targeting.  Even  this  finding  is 
confirmed by econometric tests carried out by Batini and Laxton where they found that no 
precondition  enters  significantly  in  the  equations  explaining  the  improvement  in 
macroeconomic performance following the adoption of inflation targeting. In fact, since its 
independence in 1971, Bangladesh has been conducting monetary policy with significant 
discretion.  Frequent  changes  in  political  philosophy  are  largely  attributable  to  the 
unsustainable development program. However, the source of political instability is poor 
economic  performance.  One  can  convincingly  argue  that  amongst  dramatic  changes  in 
political  power,  the  economy  of  Bangladesh  performed  comparatively  better.  In  the 
meantime foreign currency market got market determined flexible exchange rate system 
although  with  substantial  amount  of  indirect  control  by  the  central  bank.  Even  the 
prominent economists within the country forecasted a probable indiscipline in the foreign 
exchange market but finally it survived. Figure 1 demonstrates a steady increase in foreign 
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Figure 1
Foreign Currency Reserve Position in Bangladesh over 1972-2010
 
Performance  of  foreign  sector  together  with  improving  domestic  economic  indicators 
signifies  the  strength  of  Bangladesh  economy  to  absorb  inflation  targeting  regime. 
Bangladesh economy does not seem to face deliberate crises, only immediate run short 
lived  crises  appear,  that  do  not  pose  a  threat  to  overall  performance.  Besides,  Truman 
(2003) argues that if a typical economy has experienced currency crisis and poor economic 
performance in the past, the probability of inflation targeting adoption increases. Truman 
argues  these  factors  make  the  policymakers  think  that  the  existing  framework  was  not 
successful.  
Despite that Bangladesh economy did not fulfil all the preconditions above but overall 
representation  is  that  the  economy  approaches  toward  rather  than  deviate  from  those 
conditions.  Central  bank‘s  independence,  by  definition,  is  an  ambitious  notion  in  third 
world  country  perspective  but  central  bank  of  Bangladesh  got  independence  up  to  a 
satisfactory  extent.  Recently,  for  example,  Bangladesh  Bank-  the  central  bank  of 
Bangladesh  took  measures  to  introduce  distinct  salary  structure  for  their  employees. 
Besides,  they  have  substantial  degree  of  independence  in  terms  of  administrative  and 
internal policy  measures. Foreign sector of the economy  also posts the sign of  healthy 
behaviour. Deliberate increase in export earning and remarkable inflow of remittance lead 
the economy to a better position so the policymakers have the scope to think of a new 
regime-  ‗inflation  targeting‘  as  the  monetary  policy  framework.  Bangladesh  bank  has 
established a separate research organ within their own which has incredibly increased its 
technical capacity to introduce inflation targeting. Bank rate can‘t be viewed as the policy 
instrument because of its high degree of constancy but repo rate could be a good guide in 
this instance. Historical evidence suggests, in most countries inflation targeting has been 
introduced when inflation rate was already low- below 10%. Current rate of inflation in 
Bangladesh is below 10% with less volatility. We find more incentive to view Bangladesh 
economy  very  promising  in  terms  of  its  real  economic  activity.  Following  diagram 































          
Figure 1 clearly shows an exponential increase in GDP index which signifies the strength of 
the economy. Recent global recession did not affect Bangladesh economy too much that is 
evident  in  upward  trending  GDP  index.  These  evidences  could  be  placed  to  argue 
Bangladesh economy‘s comparative maturity. If we look at GDP dynamics of the US in 
figure 3, it becomes clearer that global recession slowed its growth however. Rule-guided 
monetary  policy  strategy  dates  back  to  1980  for  the  US  and  many  other  industrialized 
countries but some emerging economies including Bangladesh are far from such strategy. 
There  is  no  reason  why  Bangladesh  economy  should  be  termed  as  too  rudimentary  to 
introduce  credible  rule-based  monetary  policy.  Rather,  inflation  targeting  may  result  in 
identical success as floating exchange rate system in Bangladesh.  
Figure 3


























In addition to the above descriptive studies we also undertake some econometric studies to 
assess the implementability of rule-based policy in Bangladesh. Quarterly data spanning the 
period 1980-2010 have been used to estimate the Taylor rule. Equation (1) is manipulated 
to obtain the following estimable form: 
t 3 t 2 1 t y i                (3) 
Where,  
*




In order for the interest rate policy to be inflation-fighting,  2   should be larger than unity 
and  3  should be positive. Estimated Taylor rule is found as: 
t
) 03 . 0 (
t
) 03 . 0 ( ) 21 . 0 (
t y 01 . 0 01 . 0 04 . 15 i           (5) 
The  above  equation  does  not  comply  with  the  Taylor  rule  because  neither  the  inflation 
coefficient  nor  the  output  gap  coefficient  is  significant  and  they  have  wrong  sign.  This 
finding  is  not  very  surprising  because  the  central  bank  of  Bangladesh  does  not  follow 
Taylor rule or even they are not inflation targeting. Bangladesh Bank targets broad money 
(M2) as  an  intermediate  target  and  reserve  money  as  the  operating  instrument.  Reserve 
money  is  indirectly  influenced  by  the  available  policy  instruments  namely,  statutory 
liquidity requirement (SLR), cash reserve requirement (CRR), repurchase agreement (repo), 
reverse repo, open market operation (OMO) and moral suasion. Since our study focuses 
attention on whether interest rate policy could guide the monetary policy of Bangladesh, we 
have to examine whether interest rate have substantial influence on inflation. In order to 
examine  this  proviso,  we  resort  to  a  simple  error  correction  model.  Unit  root  in  both 
inflation and short-term nominal rate, in this case the repo rate, validates the possibility of 
cointegration.  First  we  estimate  the  interest  rate  as  a  function  of  inflation  and  then  the 
residual is tested for cointegration. Null hypothesis of cointegration can‘t be rejected thus 
estimate the error correction coefficients. Cointegrating relation is: 
t t i 38 . 0 71 . 18            (6) 
Cointegrating error,     ) i 38 . 0 71 . 18 ( e ˆ t t t         (7) 
Estimated error correction equations are:   1 t
) 13 . 0 ( ) 76 . 0 (
t e ˆ 96 . 0 01 . 0          (8) 
      1 t
) 012 . 0 ( ) 06 . 0 (
t e ˆ 001 . 0 03 . 0 i            (9) 
Estimated  error  correcting  equations  have  expected  sign  although  the  error  correction 
coefficient of the second equation is insignificant. Deviation of inflation from its long run 
equilibrium  path  is  corrected  via  the  error  correction  term.  Speed  of  adjustment  from 
disequilibrium is fairly high which in our model is 96% in each quarter.   
Responsiveness of inflation toward interest rate justifies the basis of interest rate rule under 
inflation targeting strategy in Bangladesh. The above empirical analysis bears a positive 
message to the policymakers of Bangladesh about the suitability of rule-guided monetary 
policy.  This  finding  discards  the  argument  of  some  researchers  who  use  to  argue  that 
Bangladesh economy is too rudimentary to host such advanced strategy.   
 
5. Impacts of Inflation Targeting 
It is too early to assess the economic performance of a respective economy if the new 
regime did not work for a complete business cycle. We document below some observations 
based on early research.  
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5.1 Effects on Inflation 
Petursson  (2004)  shows  that  in  the  sample  21  inflation  targeting  countries,  inflation, 
inflation  variability  and  inflation  persistence  have  clearly  fallen  on  average  after  the 
adoption of inflation targeting. The investigation also reveals that inflation went from over 
30 percent in the last five years prior to adoption to roughly 
2
1
4  percent after inflation 
targeting. Even the sample includes the four former hyperinflation countries: Brazil, Israel, 
Peru and Poland. Along with Petursson, Siklos (1999), Bernanke et al. (1999) Corbo et al 
(2001),  Levin  et  al.  (2004)  have  the  similar  investigation  that  inf lation  in  the  inflation 
targeting countries has become less volatile.   
5.2 Economic Growth 
The school that  views inflation targeting as a strict  monetary rule argues  that inflation 
targeting can be harmful for growth. Empirically this is true only for the hyperinflation 
experiencing  countries.  The  study  based  on  inflation  targeting  counties  carried  out  by 
Petursson (2004) concludes that there is no evidence suggesting that inflation targeting has 
harmed growth, rather it lowers growth variability. Truman (2003) and Ball and Sheridan 
(2003) find positive effects of inflation targeting on growth. Corbo et al. (2001), Neumann 
and  von  Hagen  (2002)  and  Truman  (2003)  drew  the  conclusion  that  flexible  inflation 
targeting does not only reduce variability in inflation but also in growth.  
 
5.3 Exchange rate volatility 
It is a conventional belief that inflation targeting generates higher volatility in exchange rate 
because  the  framework  puts  more  emphasis  on  stabilising  the  domestic  value  of  the 
currency. The practical scenario is different. Out of twenty-one countries, Petrusson (2004) 
found that exchange rate fluctuations have fallen in eleven countries and increased in ten 
countries. Eleven countries in the sample were on floating exchange rate regime and eight 
of  them  experienced  smaller  volatility  in  exchange  rate  when  switched  to  inflation 
targeting. Interestingly, exchange rate volatility decreased in all the four industrial countries 
that were on floating exchange rate system. It seems inflation targeting reduces exchange 
rate volatility rather than increasing it in those countries which had a floating exchange rate 
before  adopting  inflation  targeting.  Bangladesh  should  be  a  good  candidate  in  this 
viewpoint.  Developing  economy  like  Bangladesh  could  switch  to  inflation  targeting  by 
positively considering the evidence that some emerging countries that were fighting high 
inflation earlier could bring down inflation by switching to this monetary policy regime.  
 
Conclusion 
Inflation  targeting  can  help  achieve  macroeconomic  goals  of  price  stability  and  output 
growth.  Industrialized  economies  have  exploited  the  benefits  of  this  framework  but 
developing economies, except a few, did not redesign their policy framework in this light. 
Monetary authority of Bangladesh economy formulates policy with considerable discretion 
which is time inconsistent. Central bank did not gain much independence in terms of policy 
formulation and implementation which resulted in fiscal dominance on monetary policy. 
Since inflation targeting strategy encompasses explicit announcement of numerical inflation 
target, central bank has the opportunity to gain public confidence that would eventually 




Although there are some prerequisites to hold in order for successful implementation of 
inflation targeting, those are neither necessary conditions nor sufficient conditions for this 
success.  Nevertheless,  several  features  favourable  to  targeting  approach  do  appear  in 
Bangladesh economy which was not even the case for several inflation targeting countries. 
Stable  balance  of  payment  condition  characterised  by  sound  stock  of  foreign  currency 
reserve,  steady  growth  of  real  output  and  single  digit  inflation  phenomenon  are  some 
evidences of plausibility of inflation targeting. Recently the country got the objective of 
achieving millennium development goal through the acceleration of growth and reduction 
of poverty. Under this circumstance, if price stability is not maintained then the outcome of 
economic growth would not lead to poverty reduction. Our descriptive and econometric 
findings provide evidence that the central bank of Bangladesh has substantial sophistication 
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